"The EU is a hybrid form of political community which is neither nation-state nor intergovernmental organisation." Discuss.
From its inception with the Treaty of Rome, the process of European integration has been a hybridised process, which hasn't resembled an intergovernmental operation or a push toward the creation of a federated state. Through the vying of the opposing integration theories of neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism it has never been inevitable that it remain a hybrid. However, with the results of Treaty adjustments and additions during the 1980s and 90s, most notably being the implementation of Economic and Monetary Union, (and several states securing opt-outs from it) the shape of the EU is most definitely hybrid and `multi-speeded, (Michelmann, 2001) in nature, and will most likely remain so into the future.
The first steps toward creating a more integrated Europe were taken in 1957 with the Treaty of Rome. In the wake of World War Two, the intent of the treaty was to set up an environment within the region that took all possible benefit out of warring with European neighbours, through the creation of a common market. This is particularly the case with Germany, which would have had the most to gain from war due to its economic and demographic size. This was summed up in the 1990s by Chancellor Kohl, 'who frequently says that joining a political union improves the prospects of peace by "containing a potentially dangerous Germany within Europe"' (Feldstein, 1997).
But it was the nature of this agreement (the Rome Treaty) that set the tone for further negotiations. Made up of a Treaty and a body of law, (Bellamy, 1998) it was unlike Australia, or the United States in that it had no constitution. The treaty didn't lay the foundations for channeling power or sovereignty toward a central authority to be created, or already existing. The states that gave up a little independence by signing the treaty did it for Europe in general (Bellamy, 1998).
This eventually lead to a need to reaffirm the need for co- operation in 1987 and again in 1992. One of the main theories on the process of integration (neofunctionalism) supposed that as co- operation and the pooling of resources was established in some areas (like coal and steel), it would become logical to do the same with adjoining industry; the 'spillover' effect (Øhrgaard, 1997). This didn't happen, there was resistance from some states toward further handing over of pieces of sovereignty to a supranational authority (Bellamy, 1998).
It was a matter of how leaders of states, European statespeople and analysts saw the process of integration. Some were concerned with protecting their state's de facto and de jure sovereignty, and perceived that further integration was giving that sovereignty away to something that wasn't really there, or had no authority.
Others didn't see it as 'handing over' sovereignty but `depositing' it in the (then) European Community which in the end, didn't weaken any given state but strengthened them all. And still other people saw the process to be one that bears no comparison to existing models. The relationship between a state and the supranational institution, the EC/EU, spreads sovereignty between the two and farms out decision making processes over many levels (Lynch, 1999).
The reaffirmation, or adjustment of the Treaty in 1987 focused on the areas of goods, services, freedom of movement (of people and capital) and the rights of European citizens (Christiansen, 2001). As with the original draft of the treaty it was a situation where states were obligated to obey the law of the treaty (and be fined or penalised if they didn't) but also to enforce it themselves within their own states (Bellamy, 1998).
The treaty of 1992 (Maastricht) set in place plans for the introduction of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). This required states to hand control of their central banks over to the EU institution of the European Central Bank. The Euro became an electronic currency in 1999 and replaced states' paper and coin currencies in 2002 (Christiansen, 2001).
Theorists writing in the mid-late 1990s seemed to indicate that the process would be fraught with pitfalls, taking an 'all or none' approach to the Euro's viability. Marquand (Marquand, 1994) was correct in that the Euro would be fairly well directed by Germany, but all other state economies participating in the EMU increased their influence and relative autonomy within international society by joining EMU (Lynch, 1999). At this point in 2002, transition to the EU controlled currency seems to be a success. It's a good example of the EU's flexibility and ability to straddle the gap between intergovernmental organisation and federation-style super-state. Three of the member states¹ were able to secure opt-outs, and have delayed joining the monetary union.
The EU took this added complication in its stride and went ahead with EMU. Perhaps an indication that the 'day-to-day, workings of the EU institutions had become effective - balancing with the bargaining of the Inter-governmental conferences can be seen in Lynch's statement (Lynch, 1999) that,
No single factor can adequately account for the move towards EMU. Dyson characterises the EMU policy process as having a "hollow core", a dynamic process without a single policy-brokering centre.
The fact that states can be in the EU but not yet a part of the EMU has brought a new facet to European integration; that of it being a multi-staged or 'multi-speed, process (Marquand, 1994). The fact that this is possible is a good sign for prospective members such as Poland, who are very close to ready to join the EU but may need more time before joining EMU (Long, 2001).
The movement of EU integration currently can't be cleanly categorised as deepening the further integration of existing members or widening by bringing in new members (Marquand, 1994). Widening by itself could be seen as moving the EU toward becoming more intergovernmental in nature, while deepening by itself could seen as moving toward a federated state. In its gradualised way, the EU is doing both, again displaying its hybridised nature.
The structure of the EU's institutions and how they interact is different to a nation state's Parliament, such as Australia's and also different to how an intergovernmental body like the UN works. There is a European Parliament, elected by the citizens of each member's respective state, similar to how a state is run, and there is the Council of Ministers, made up of elected (by state governments) ministers representing each state in the EU. In addition to these two is the European Commission, which is made up of appointees of national governments, and attempts to represent all people of Europe equally (Shapcott, 2000). Together these three are known as the 'institutional triangle'².
The European Court of Justice maintains legal order within the EU. Its decisions can override law made by member states, which is significant because it effectively erodes de jure state sovereignty and replaces it with a mix of existing state-based legal jurisdiction and supra-national law. This principle that places EU law above state law is one that the Court of Justice developed itself, without it having been written into the treaties agreed upon at Inter-Governmental Conferences (Christiansen, 2001).
However, as Lynch says, 'The supremacy of Community law is not limitless. The European Communities Act that was passed in English parliament in 1972 bound future governments to Community law, but it didn't prevent a future government from repealing the act (Lynch, 1999). This is a good reminder that while integration has so far been the major trend in Europe, nothing (including EMU membership) is irreversible.
Community law implemented by the European Court of Justice extends from the governments of the nation states right down to the citizen. EU citizen rights are in addition to those of their state and in the eyes of the EU the state is held responsible when an individual's community rights are breached. However, what these rights entail is mostly to do with worker's rights at the moment and, so far, has left issues like welfare in the hands of national governments. It also should be acknowledged that EU citizenship is 'built on top of' state citizenship. At present, state citizenship could still exist without EU citizenship but not vice versa (Lynch, 1999).
Another area where EU policy has poked through the membranes of states is that of subnational government and regions. The EU actively involves subnational governments in making and implementing regional policy. But so far the results in this area have been limited and the leaders of regions still rely on their respective national governments (Lynch, 1999).
But it's interesting that, if this trend were to continue it would begin to undermine state sovereignty from within. The states where regionalism exists start to look less like blocs and more liquid in nature, with essentially a better ratio of representation within the Council of the Ministers. The overall effect is that the EU looks less like an inter-governmental organisation, but not like a nation-state either, because of its recognition of the subnational governments and their respective regions³.
While the relatively successful integration of economics via EMU gives the impression of the EU becoming increasingly statelike, the lack of progress in the formation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) does not.
It is conceivable that the forming of a CFSP could be broken into stages which would add yet more layers to a multi-speeded approach to integration. To date the EU has been highly effective at using trade and foreign aid in support of its long term economic interests, due to the interests of the actual states in this area converging. But interests and opinions difffer significantly among the state actors when it comes to security issues like how to react to crisis situations like Bosnia, and military intervention (Gordon, 1997/8).
If it were the case that a CFSP was split into three levels, then this would almost ensure that the EU would remain a hybrid of nation-state and intergovernmental organisation. The diversity of states involved and where they each are on the road to integration would be enormous; from a vanguard of core member states like Germany, France and Italy gradually getting closer to implementing a full CFSP, to the UK still standing outside the gates of EMU, to hopefuls like Lithuania and even Turkey at the end of the queue waiting to get in. It would be insane to think that the latter could jump straight from accession to binding themselves to a CFSP; they, like the others before them would move in a gradual fashion.
But the question should be asked, 'How common is a CFSP if not all member states are involved?' Is there a
qualitative difference between EMU and a CFSP, or could the latter be staggered as the former has been?
The EC/EU has come a long way - from being a small 'care-taker, body performing administration
between IGCs to an actor in its own right in the world's political scene. Most analysts conclude that an EU CFSP is extremely unlikely in eventuating, if at all.
Yet ten years ago they were saying the same thing about EMU. However, until a CFSP is implemented, with an appointed EU institution acting on it, (complete with unified military and law enforcement arms) then the EU will remain a hybrid of intergovernmental organisation and nation state.
Team Sunny Breaks
1. Denmark, Sweden and the U.K.
2. From http://europa.eu
3. At this time, we'll never know how much parochial sentiments and calls for independence would have
bubbled up regardless of the EU in regard to regions like Catalonia, Scotland and Wales.
Bellamy, R., & Warleigh, A., 1998, 'From an Ethics of Integration to an Ethics of Participation: Citizenship and the future of the European Union', Millennium, Vol.27, No.3, pp. 447-470
Christiansen, T., 2001, 'European and Regional Integration', The Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to International Relations, Baylis, J. & Smith, S., (eds) Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 495-518
Feldstein, Martin, 1997, `The EMU and International Conflict', Foreign Affairs, November/December
Gordon, V., 1997/8, 'Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy', International Security, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 74-100
Long, David, 2001, 'The EU and the Variables of Enlargement', Between Actor and Presence, G. A. MacLean, (ed), University of Ottawa, Canada, pp. 11-43
Lynch, P., 1999, `Sovereignty and European Union: Eroded, Enhanced, Fragmented', Citizenship and identity in Europe', Aldershot, Ashgate
Marquand, D., 1994, 'Prospects for a Federal Europe', New Left Review, vol.203
Michelmann, Hans, J., 2001, 'The Perils of Treaty Amendment in the European Union: The 1996-97 IGC and EU Enlargement', Between Actor and Presence, G. A. MacLean, (ed), University of Ottawa, Canada, pp. 43-79
Ø hrgaard, Jakob., C., 1997, '"Less than Supranational, More than Intergovernmental": European Political Cooperation and the Dynamics of Intergovernmental Integration', Millennium, 'Vol. 26, No.1, pp. 1-29
Shapcott, R., 2000, 'The European Union', The End Of The World As We Know It?: Study Guide, Deakin University, Australia, pp. 83-98
The European Union, 'Explanatory note on the "Community method"', http://europa.eu,int/index-en.htm [viewed: 9/6/02]
This essay was submitted on Thursday the 6th of May, 2002 - and was written in the week before that. I got 80% for it!
This `online' version includes a glossary of terms to assist the lay-person of international relations studies. Permission is granted to reuse any part of this essay for non-profit purposes; all I ask is that you acknowledge this web page in your references. And remember kids, if you can find this web page, then so can your lecturer ;^)
intergovernmental - of or relating to two or more governments. The United Nations is an example of an intergovernmental organisation.
intergovernmentalism - is the approach to integration that contrasts with neofunctionalism. Intergovernmentalists generally only agree on integration between states when it's of direct benefit to their own state. A simplistic and not always accurate way of looking at the two opposing views is intergovernmentalism: pessimistic pesimistic, and agreement being based on the lowest common denominator -- whereas neofunctionalism tends to be a bit more optimistic/idealistic and decisions aren't always based on the immediate profit/security benefits.
neofunctionalism - to me means; `build the structure and the people will come'. Re: the formation of the EC/EU neofuctionalists advocated creating the institutions (eg. European commission, European Court of Justice) and as their functioning became necessary, more power would be handed to them. neofunctionalists are big on the `spillover' effect too.